Securities-Investment Advisers Act of 1940-Antifraud Provisions Interpreted by Bronston, Byron, S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 61 Issue 6 
1963 
Securities-Investment Advisers Act of 1940-Antifraud Provisions 
Interpreted 
Byron Bronston S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Byron Bronston S.Ed., Securities-Investment Advisers Act of 1940-Antifraud Provisions Interpreted, 61 
MICH. L. REV. 1185 (1963). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol61/iss6/12 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1963] RECENT DECISIONS 1185 
SECURITIES-INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940-ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS 
INTERPRETED-Defendant, Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., an invest-
ment advisory service, published a bulletin entitled "A Capital Gains 
Report," each issue of which advised approximately 5,000 subscribers as 
to the investment potential of a particular corporation's stock. On at least 
five occasions Capital Gains, and its president and sole stockholder, also a 
defendant, acquired some shares of a stock and, without revealing their 
interest therein, recommended its purchase in the bulletin. Following each 
recommendation, trading in the stock increased, the price rose, and, within 
a few days, defendants sold their shares at a profit.1 The Securities and 
Exchange Commission, alleging that defendants, by failing to disclose 
their individual interests in the stocks, had violated section 206, clauses 
(I) and (2), of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,2 sought a temporary 
restraining order, preliminary injunction, and final injunction against 
defendants. Clauses (I) and (2) provide: "It shall be unlawful for any 
investment adviser • • • (I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud any client or prospective client; (2) to engage in any transaction, 
practice, or course of business, which operates as a fraud or deceit upon 
any client or prospective client." The district court denied the motion 
for a preliminary injunction.3 A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit affirmed, one judge dissenting.4 Upon rehearing 
en bane, held, affirmed, four judges dissenting. Under clauses (I) and (2), 
an investment adviser is under no affirmative duty to those advised to 
disclose information regarding his personal holdings in a recommended 
stock. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 
1962), cert. granted, 371 U.S. 967 (1963). 
At common law, where one party to a business transaction is under 
a duty of disclosure, he is liable to the other for harm caused by his in-
tentional failure to disclose facts of which the other is ignorant and which. 
1 On a sixth occasion, defendants took a short position in a stock and, without 
disclosing this position, advised that the stock was overvalued. Immediately following 
this advice, trading in the stock increased, the price fell, and defendants bought in at 
a profit. 
2 54 Stat. 852, 15 U.S.C. §§ SOb-6(1), (2) (1958). For general surveys of the act, see 
2 Loss, SECUJUTIES R.EcULAnoN 1!192-1417 (2d ed. 1961); !I id. at 1515-18; Reese, Securities 
Legislation of 1960, 17 Bus. I.Aw. 412 (1962). 
3 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
4 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., !100 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1961). 
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he would regard as material in determining his course of action.5 The early 
development of this form of the law of deceit occurred in the context of 
the traditional fiduciary or confidential relationships involving, for ex-
ample, agents and trustees. 6 The extent to which Congress, in enacting 
clauses (I) and (2), intended to apply them to the comparatively modem 
investment adviser-client relationship, and to liberalize the common-law 
requirements of the tort in recognition of the special needs of the securities 
business, presented the pivotal issue in the principal case. 
In response to this issue, the district court ruled that the concepts of 
fraud and deceit in clauses (1) · and (2) were employed by Congress in the 
strict common-law sense, that in order to sustain a violation it is necessary 
to prove that defendants' conduct resulted in loss to clients or prospective 
clients, and that no such showing had been made.7 This interpretation 
seems unduly restrictive. In construing various antifraud provisions of the 
federal securities laws, in particular section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 
1933,8 upon which clauses (I) and (2) were based,9 the courts have fre-
quently declared that in order to sustain a violation every element of 
common-law deceit need not be proved;10 in particular, proof of loss has 
been deemed unnecessary.11 This liberalization is the result of a recogni-
tion by Congress and the courts of the unique nature of the securities 
business.12 "The essential objective of securities legislation is to protect 
5 PROSSER, TORTS§ 87 (2d ed. 1955); REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 551 (1938). 
6 2 REsTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 389 (1958); 1 REsTATEMENT (SECOND), TRusrs 
§ 170 (1959). 
7 Alternatively, the court said that proof that defendants intended their clients or 
prospective clients to suffer a loss would satisfy clauses (1) and (2). Yet, not even at 
common law was such an intent an element of the tort of deceit. 1 HARPER &: JAMES, 
TORTS § 7.3 (1956); PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 5, § 88. 
s 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958). 
9 Hearings on S. 1178 to S. 1182 Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate 
Banking and Currency Committee, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 516-17 (1959); 3 Loss, op. cit. 
supra note 2, at 1515. Clauses (1) and (3) of § 17 provide: "It shall be unlawful for 
any person in the offer or sale of any securities ..• (1) to employ any device, scheme, 
or artifice to defraud, or • • • (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 
48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958). 
10 Norris &: Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Hughes v. SEC, 
174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Hughes &: Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. 
denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944); Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 
U.S. 767 (1943). Though such statements have usually been made in regard to deceit 
by misrepresentation, they would seem to apply with equal force to deceit by nondis-
closure. 
11 "The fraud known to common law which required reliance on the alleged false 
statements and resulting damage to the person addressed is not the fraud required to 
constitute a violation of § 17(a)(l) of the Securities Act of 1933." Los Angeles Trust 
Deed &: Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 264 F.2d 199, 210 (9th Cir. 1959). Similarly, in Hughes 
v. SEC, supra note 10, at 974, a suit to revoke a broker-dealer's registration for fraudulent 
activities, the court said that "the revocation is proper even if one, or none, of the 
particular clients here involved has been misled or has suffered injury." 
12 "The business of trading in securities is one in which opportunities for dis-
honesty are of constant recurrence and ever present. It engages acute, active minds, 
trained to quick apprehension, decision and action. The Congress has seen fit to 
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those who do not know market conditions from . . . those who do."13 
Apparently recognizing the unreasonableness of the requirement of 
proof of loss under clauses (I) and (2), the majority in the principal case 
rejected the district court's position. It affirmed, however, the finding that 
deceit by nondisclosure had not been proved, on the ground that an invest-
ment adviser is under no affirmative duty to those advised to reveal in-
formation regarding his personal holdings in a recommended stock. This 
determination was based primarily upon implications drawn from a recent 
amendment of section 206 and the legislative history preceding that amend-
ment. In 1960, Congress altered section 206 by adding clause (4), which 
provides: "It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser ... (4) to en-
gage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, decep-
tive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this 
paragraph (4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reason-
ably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business as 
are fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative."14 In support of the enactment 
of this provision, the SEC had expressed the doubt that clauses (I) and (2) 
were limited by common-law concepts of fraud and deceit, and suggested 
that clause (4) would enable the Commission "to deal adequately with such 
problems as a material adverse interest in securities which the adviser is 
recommending to his clients."15 This purported inadequacy of clauses (I) 
and (2) induced Congress to enact clause (4).16 Likewise, it influenced 
the holding of the majority of the court in the principal case. 
It is clear, nevertheless, that the relationship between the adviser and 
his clients should be one of trust and confidence.17 Indeed, he has been 
termed a fiduciary,18 a characterization which has found some judicial 
support.10 Whether he advises individual clients in personal interviews or 
a large number of persons through the mails, the investment adviser 
expressly or impliedly represents that he is disinterested and that his paid 
regulate this business. Though such regulation must be done in strict subordination 
to constitutional and lawful safeguards of individual rights, it is to be enforced not-
withstanding the frauds to be suppressed may take on more subtle and involved forms 
than those in which dishonesty manifests itself in cruder and less specialized activities." 
Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1943). 
13 Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943). 
14 74 Stat. 887 (1960), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (Supp. III, 1961). 
15 Hearings on S. 1178 to S. 1182, supra note 9, at 516-17. At the same time, the 
SEC pointed out that "the language of section 206, making it unlawful to employ 
any device to defraud a client, or to engage in any transaction which operates as a 
deceit upon a client, are modeled on clauses (I) and (3) of section 17(a) of the Securities 
Act of 1933. Under that section the common law deceit concepts no longer acted as a 
bar to the defrauded buyer. • • . Therefore, a question arises as to the SEC's claim 
that it has been limited by these concepts under section 206." Id. at 516-17. 
16 See S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1960). 
17 That such a relationship should exist was expressly approved by the majority. 
Principal case at 608. 
18 SEC Securities Act Release No. 3043, Feb. 5, 1945. 
10 Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
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advice is in the best interests of his clients. Yet he is not disinterested if he 
himself is also a beneficial owner of a recommended stock. Viewed against 
this back.ground, the weight given by the majority of the court to the 
SEC's pronouncements before Congress, without an actual examination 
of the relationship between the investment adviser and his customers or 
the duties to which that relationship might give rise, is seemingly un-
justified. 
In SEC v. Torr,20 the presence of an undisclosed personal interest, 
economically similar to that of the defendants in the principal case, was 
held to constitute a violation of section 17(a)(l) of the Securities Act. 
There, certain defendants recommended the purchase of a particular 
stock without disclosing that they were to receive bonuses on those pur-
chases resulting from their recommendations. Judge Patterson stated that 
it was plain enough that this selling campaign "operated as a deceit on 
purchasers.''21 The majority in the principal case approved the Torr deci-
sion, but apparently sought to distinguish it factually. In contrast to Torr, 
the majority declared that "the SEC's proof tends only to show that, at 
.most, defendant ... profited personally from the predictable market effect 
of his honest advice."22 Yet, in Torr, it could be said with equal accuracy 
-that defendants merely profited from the predictable market effect of their 
"honest" advice. As in the principal case, there was nothing to indicate that 
any defendant misrepresented any fact bearing on the intrinsic worth of 
the recommended stock. Nor can the cases be convincingly distinguished 
on the basis of the relatively slight difference between the personal interests 
of the respective defendants. Though Torr was, of course, a Securities Act 
case, the origin of clauses (I) and (2) in section 17(a) and the policy of 
Congress in favor of a broad construction of the securities laws suggest 
that clauses (1) and (2) should be interpreted with the same justifiable 
liberality which has been applied to the Securities Act generally, and, 
specifically, that defendants' conduct in the principal case was, indeed, 
within the scope of those provisions.23 
The SEC's new rule-making power under clause (4) appears to have 
influenced the majority's determination to a large extent. The majority 
chose not to decide whether the first sentence, declaring fraudulent, de-
20 15 F. Supp. 315 (S,D.N.Y. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937). 
21 Id. at 317. "When a person gives advice to buy a stock under circumstances that 
lead the listener or reader to believe that the advice is disinterested, and suppresses the 
fact that for giving such advice he is in reality being paid by one anxious to sell the 
stock, the purchaser acting on the advice is imposed upon and deceived." Ibid. 
22 Principal case at 609. 
23 In an opinion of James A. Treanor, Jr., Director of the Trading and Exchange 
Division, it was said: "An investment adviser is a fiduciary. As such he is required by 
the common law to serve the interests of his client with undivided loyalty. In -my opinion 
a breach of this duty may constitute a fraud within the meaning of clauses (1) and (2) 
of section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act (as well as the antifraud provisions of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)." SEC Securities Act 
Release No. 3043, Feb. 5, 1945. A similar position has been taken by Professor Loss. 
See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1515. 
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ceptive, or manipulative practices unlawful, was intended to be self-opera-
tive, that is, whether it could be invoked without the antecedent promulga-
tion of regulations by the SEC. That such was the apparent intent of 
Congress in the enactment of clause (4), however, would seem to follow 
from the fact that its language was derived substantially from section 
15(c)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a provision generally 
agreed to be self-operative.24 In spite of the pronounced similarity between 
these two sections in both language and purpose, the majority went on 
to express a definite preference for antifraud enforcement under detailed 
Commission rules, rather than through the judicial interpretation and ap-
plication of broad statutory provisions.25 It would be unfortunate, how-
ever, if detailed regulations were to become the sole effective means of 
enforcing section 206. The promulgation of such rules is an uncertain and 
time-consuming process,26 and, if such rules must be applicable only to 
specific types of fraudulent activities before the courts will view them favor~ 
ably, schemes may easily be devised to avoid their limited impact. The 
congressional desire to strengthen the antifraud provisions of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act would be better served by a finding that the first sen-
tence of clause (4) is self-operative, and by ascribing to it, and to rules 
created under clause (4), the liberal construction common to other securities 
laws. 
Byron Bronston, S.Ed 
24 48 Stat. 895, as amended, 49 Stat. 1378 (1936), added by 52 Stat. 1075 (1938), 15 
U.S.C. § 780(c)(2) (1958); 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1425-26, 1517. 
25 In its original opinion, the majority said: "[I]t seems appropriate that courts in 
piecemeal fashion do not try to take over the regulatory function of the SEC and single 
out a rather small advisory service and hold it in advance of trial responsible for viola-
tion of a rule which has not yet been promulgated and as to which there is no certainty 
that it ever will be." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 300 F.2d 745, 751 
(2d Cir. 1961). 
26 Judge Clark said in dissent: "Some of my brothers seemingly draw some comfort 
in believing that the destructive effect of this construction of the statute will be limited 
in effect and duration because of powers now granted to the SEC by the 1960 amend-
,ment to the statute .•.. The thought seems to be that the SEC will hereafter outlaw 
the defendants' activities by regulation. This suggests an easy solution to a problem which 
is obviously bemusing the court. But like many an 'easy' solution it becomes in reality 
the harder one because of the difficulties it creates. Among those difficulties are those 
of time, of power and validity of the indicated action, of legislative policy in the 
premises, and of potential paralysis of agency action and the execution of Congressional 
policies." Principal case at 618. 
